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INTRODUCTION
Women in the United States, Europe, and Australia protested their
nations’ respective “tampon taxes” in 2015 and 2016 with a significant
amount of success. These advocates vastly increased the amount of
awareness and media attention on the tampon tax, which led to the
elimination or reduction of the tax in some American cities and states,
Canada, and France. 1 The so-called tampon tax is the tax levied on
feminine hygiene products: tampons, sanitary napkins, and menstrual

1
Examples of recent article headlines include: “No Taxation on our Menstruation!,” “The Fight to
End Period Shaming Is Going Mainstream,”; and “Periods Are Not a Luxury.” See, e.g., Maggie
Stamets, No Taxation on Our Menstruation!: This Lawsuit Could End the Tampon Tax, BUST,
https://bust.com/feminism/15819-no-taxation-on-our-menstruation-this-lawsuit-could-end-the-tampontax.html [https://perma.cc/Y53P-5V38]; Abigail Jones, The Fight to End Period Shaming Is Going
Mainstream, BUST (Apr. 20, 2016, 6:01 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/04/29/womens-periodsmenstruation-tampons-pads-449833.html [https://perma.cc/HW2M-5QJP]; Cristina Garcia, Periods Are
Not a Luxury: California Assemblywoman Cristina Garcia on Why She’s Still Fighting to Make
Tampons and Pads More Affordable and Accessible, COSMOPOLITAN (Jan. 26, 2017),
http://www.cosmopolitan.com/politics/a8642997/tampon-tax-california-periods/
[https://perma.cc/BML6-3WPZ].

314

112:313 (2017)

End the Bloody Taxation

cups. 2 Consumers and legislators across the world have openly questioned
why items like dandruff shampoo and lip balm are often exempt from state
and federal taxes as “medical appliances” or “necessities” while tampons
and pads continue to be taxed in most states. This questioning finally came
to a head in 2015 and 2016 when groups of women in New York, 3 Florida, 4
California, 5 and Ohio, 6 filed class action lawsuits contending that state
taxes on feminine hygiene products were unconstitutional. Then, state
legislatures in New York, 7 Illinois, 8 and California 9 passed bills exempting
tampons and other feminine hygiene products from state sales taxes. At the
same time, Canada exempted feminine products from its sales tax, 10 and
efforts to abolish the tampon tax continued in the United Kingdom 11 and
Australia. 12 Even President Barack Obama commented on the tax,
suggesting that the tampon tax exists because men were the ones debating
and ultimately passing state tax laws and perhaps were either unconcerned
with 13 or ignorant of women’s need for feminine hygiene products.

2
See Period Products: Information About Tampons, Pads, and More, Health Guides, CENTER FOR
YOUNG WOMEN’S HEALTH (last updated May 6, 2016), http://youngwomenshealth.org/2013/03/28/
period-products [https://perma.cc/98GX-PNDR] (giving explanations and definitions for menstrual
products including tampons, pads, period panties, and menstrual cups).
3
See Complaint, Seibert v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 3, 2016) (No.
151800/2016).
4
See Complaint, Wendell v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 6, 2016) (No. 2016-CA1526).
5
See Complaint, DiSimone v. California (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2016) (No. CGC-16-552458).
6
See Complaint, Rowitz v. Ohio Dep’t of Taxation (Ohio Ct. of Claims, Apr. 11, 2016) (No. 201600197) (dismissed without prejudice). Refiled as class action. See Complaint, Rowitz v. Ohio, (Franklin
Cty., Ohio Ct. Common Pleas Apr. 11, 2016) (No. 2016-CV-003518).
7
S.B. 7838, 2016 S., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2016).
8
H.B. 818, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017).
9
Assemb. B. 1561, 2015 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). The governor, however, vetoed the
statute, arguing that the state needed the funds it would receive from the tax on tampons and pads. See,
e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Governor Wrong to Veto End of “Pink Tax,” ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Sept.
22,
2016,
8:00
AM),
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/tax-729792-products-women.html
[https://perma.cc/KRT7-DL3L].
10
Jason Fekete, Federal Government Taking the Tax off Tampons and Other Feminine Hygiene
Products, Effective July 1, NAT’L POST (May 28, 2015, 4:11 PM), http://news.nationalpost.com/news/
canada/federal-government-taking-the-tax-off-tampons-and-other-feminine-hygiene-products-effectivejuly-1 [https://perma.cc/29KY-KSL9].
11
Tampon Tax: France MPs Back VAT Cut on Sanitary Products, BBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35070148 [https://perma.cc/FGP4-VHCE].
12
“Tampon Tax”: Australia Decides Not [sic] Remove Controversial Levy, BBC NEWS (Aug. 21,
2015), www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-34013354 [https://perma.cc/BB7Z-TJBZ].
13
Elise Foley, Obama Pretty Sure Clueless Men Are the Reason Tampons Are Taxed as Luxury
Items, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2016, 3:57 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/obamatampon-tax_us_569950f0e4b0778f46f94d97 [https://perma.cc/EBW6-A7ER].
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In the United States, each state legislature has the authority to
determine its own sales tax. 14 Most states tax all personal non-real property
through their respective sales taxes but carve out exemptions for certain
goods, which are usually whatever the state defines as a medical appliance
or a necessity. Sales-taxed items thus carry the inherent implication that
they are luxury, nonnecessary goods. Sales taxes usually at least exclude
groceries, food stamp purchases, and medical appliances. 15 Tax-exempt
“medical appliances” can be a broad category, including products ranging
from prescription medicine and insulin to lip balm and cotton balls,
depending upon the state. 16 Some cities and states have additional
exemption categories, such as agriculture supplies and clothing beneath a
certain price point.17
Proponents of abolishing the tax on feminine hygiene products
contend that access to tampons and sanitary napkins is a basic human rights
issue, that these products are necessary medical goods, and that levying a
tax on a gendered product is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
14
See State and Local Taxes, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (last updated Dec. 5, 2010),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Taxes/Pages/state-local.aspx [https://perma.cc/G9NQFBZU].
15
See, e.g., FLA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, Nontaxable Medical Itmes and General Grocery List (Jan.
2016),
http://floridarevenue.com/Forms_library/current/dr46nt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8R9E-FG7F]
(outlining the nontaxable medical items, common household remedies, and grocery items in the state of
Florida, including items such as thermometers, bandages, earwax-removal products, bunion pads, lip
balms, and virtually all grocery items); IND. DEP’T OF REVENUE, Informational Bulletin #29, app. A
(Apr. 2016), https://www.in.gov/dor/files/sib29.pdf [https://perma.cc/4J4N-8D83] (clarifying that
bakery items, baking chocolate, BBQ potato chips, frosting, ice cream, pickles, and trail mix are among
the tax-free food items in Indiana); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., Important SNAP Information,
https://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/default/files/Retailer_Notice_111412.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GKG5HQQB] (explaining that Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) users may purchase food
items that are subject to sales tax but that sales tax “cannot be charged when SNAP is used to make the
purchase”).
16
See, e.g., PA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, Sales and Use Tax: Taxability of Medical & Surgical Supplies
(June 3, 2008), http://revenue.pa.gov/GeneralTaxInformation/Tax%20Types%20and%20Information/
Documents/SUT/sut-taxability_medical-surgical_supplies.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HZM-2TX7] (listing
exempt items, including gauze pads); TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, Tax Topics: Sales
Tax
Exemptions
for
Over-the-Counter
Drugs
and
Medicines,
(Nov.
2012),
https://comptroller.texas.gov/taxes/publications/94-155.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MQS6-RW5C]
(explaining that over-the-counter drugs are exempt from Texas state sales tax, including acne treatment
products, hand sanitizer, antiperspirants, cold remedies, and cough suppressants, as well as wound care
dressings, like adhesive bandages, gauze rolls and pads, and medical tape).
17
Sarah Larimer, The “Tampon Tax,” Explained, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Jan. 8, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/01/08/the-tampon-tax-explained/
[https://perma.cc/6BHZ-LJJ5]; see also MASS. DEP’T OF REV., A Guide to Sales and Use Tax,
MASS.GOV (last updated Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.mass.gov/dor/individuals/taxpayer-help-andresources/tax-guides/salesuse-tax-guide.html#exempt [https://perma.cc/TCK8-C9ZB] (explaining that
in Massachusetts, clothing “is generally exempt from the sales tax” but that “any individual clothing
item costing more than $175 is taxable on the amount over the basic exemption”).
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Equal Protection Clause. The effect of the tax on women is enormous: the
average woman is estimated to have roughly 450 periods in her lifetime,
and since nearly every woman uses feminine hygiene products during her
period, the additional cost imposed by state sales tax on feminine hygiene
products adds up. 18 Many low-income women have difficulty obtaining
feminine hygiene products and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP) does not offer funds that may be used toward purchasing
them, forcing women with limited means to be resourceful—by using old
rags, for instance. 19 Additionally, the very fact that tampons are used to
absorb a bodily fluid during menstruation means the tax raises public health
and sanitation concerns. 20
Furthermore, feminine hygiene products seem to fit the tax-free
categorization of medical appliances or necessities better than some of the
existing items in those categories. For example, before the New York state
legislature finally exempted tampons and sanitary pads from local and state
sales taxes, Rogaine, birth control pills, condoms, bandages, dandruff
shampoo, and lip balm had long been exempt due to their use as medical
equipment or, more generally, to aid health.21 Moreover, the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) classifies feminine hygiene products as

18
Jordan Gass-Poore’, Citing Gender Bias, State Lawmakers Move to Eliminate “Tampon Tax,”
NPR POL. (Mar. 6, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/03/06/467377295/citing-gender-biasstate-lawmakers-move-to-eliminate-tampon-tax [https://perma.cc/WJ3K-PRT5].
19
Bryce Covert, Most Homeless Women Can’t Get Pads or Tampons. These Women Want to
Change That., THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 22, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/most-homelesswomen-cant-get-pads-or-tampons-these-women-want-to-change-that-fc8b983d0c98#.d9mdkjalw
[https://perma.cc/AA7J-3ZU3]. The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) runs SNAP, the “largest
program in the domestic hunger safety net.” Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), FOOD
& NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (last updated Jan. 30, 2017),
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap
[https://perma.cc/3YMX-MJ4P]. FNS coordinates with various state agencies, educators, and local
organizations to help those eligible for nutrition assistance access the program. Id.
20
See Ashley Fetters, The Tampon: A History, THE ATLANTIC (June 1, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/06/history-of-the-tampon/394334/
[https://perma.cc/VHW4-NUQG] (examining the complex history of the development of the tampon, its
use for menstruation, and its role in public health crises).
21
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN., Drugstores and Pharmacies (Aug. 5, 2014),
https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/tg_bulletins/sales/b14_193s.pdf [https://perma.cc/78QV-DWKL] (Tax
Bulletin: Sales and Use Tax, TB-ST-193); see Verified Class Action Complaint at 1, Seibert v. N.Y.
State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) (No. 151800/2016); see also John J. Flanagan,
Senate Gives Final Passage to Legislation that Would Eliminate the Tax on Feminine Hygiene
Products, N.Y. STATE SENATE (May 25, 2016), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/john-j-flanagan/senate-gives-final-passage-legislation-would-eliminate-tax
[https://perma.cc/UT6X-RBWZ] (stating that prior to the inclusion of feminine hygiene products,
“medicine, medical equipment, supplies to correct or alleviate physical incapacity, and products
consumed by humans for the preservation of health” were tax exempt).
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“medical device[s],” 22 yet most states with sales taxes exclude them from
that category. 23 Tampons and sanitary pads are instead consistently placed
in state tax regulations alongside cosmetic products and hygiene
products—which the FDA has not categorized as medical appliances—like
hand sanitizers, baby powder, shaving cream, and breath spray. 24 While
efforts to abolish the tax on tampons proliferate, in most states, the tax
continues unabated. 25
The uproar over the tampon tax is more than mere annoyance that a
product has not been properly recognized as a necessity. Rather, to tampon
tax protestors, the levy on feminine hygiene products is shockingly
discriminatory and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. They see the
tax as part of a larger pattern of governmental failure to prioritize women’s
needs by both relying on revenues from taxes on a health care product that
women use out of biological necessity and omitting these medical products
from tax exemption. Furthermore, feminine hygiene products are a unique
category of goods with no easy comparison. It is not simple to think of
another medically necessary product used by virtually everyone of one sex
but by no one of the other. As Erwin Chemerinsky wrote regarding the
tampon tax, “[i]f the government were to say that only men or only women
had to pay an additional tax of several hundred dollars a year solely
because of their sex, that would be clearly an unconstitutional denial of
equal protection.”26
In discussing these issues involving the tampon tax, this Note
proceeds in five parts. First, Part I situates the movement to end the tampon
tax within the broader history of feminist activism related to tampons and
menstruation. Part II next outlines the 2015 and 2016 litigation and
legislative efforts to eliminate the tax on feminine hygiene products in the
United States and abroad. Then, Part III discusses the “exacting scrutiny”
22
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF—MENSTRUAL
TAMPONS AND PADS: INFORMATION FOR PREMARKET NOTIFICATION SUBMISSIONS (510(K)S) 13
(2005),
https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/
ucm071781.htm [https://perma.cc/HWY8-U37A] (recommending that labeling for tampons comply
with the required disclosures for medical devices).
23
Suzannah Weiss, 12 States Without a Tampon Tax, Because People Who Menstruate Shouldn’t
Be Penalized for Having a Period, BUSTLE (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.bustle.com/articles/17991412-states-without-a-tampon-tax-because-people-who-menstruate-shouldnt-be-penalized-for-having-a
[https://perma.cc/B9DZ-FF3E] (explaining that as of August 1, 2016, thirty-nine states taxed tampon
sales).
24
See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 86, § 130.311(c)(2)(O) (2014) (placing feminine hygiene
products into the category of “grooming and hygiene products” alongside shampoo, shaving cream,
deodorant, baby powder, hand sanitizer, acne products, and lip balm).
25
Gass-Poore’, supra note 18.
26
Chemerinsky, supra note 9.
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test used in Equal Protection challenges to sex discrimination and the
existing Equal Protection tax scholarship—both of which would play a part
in any constitutional challenge regarding the tampon tax. Part IV uses that
framework, and the “exacting scrutiny” analysis, to discuss the tampon tax
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
Finally, Part V discusses how that analysis supports the argument that we
should abolish the tampon tax.
I.

WHY NOW?: THE PUSH FOR ELIMINATING THE TAMPON TAX IN
CONTEXT

The international focus on the tampon tax has emerged during a time
characterized by an increase in feminist foreign policies,27 escalating
feminist Internet activism, 28 intensifying Internet-based protests, 29 and even
arguably a new global fourth-wave feminism. 30
Bridget Crawford and Carla Spivak, legal scholars and professors of
law, have demonstrated that the tampon tax issue illustrates the surprisingly
gendered nature of seemingly neutral institutions such as the tax system. 31
They argue that tax reform in particular is necessary for gender equality. 32
Crawford and Spivak have persuasively suggested four main reasons for

27

Marie O’Reilly, Feminist Foreign Policies Are Gaining Popularity, and Increasing the Peace,
PRI (Oct. 27, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-10-27/feminist-foreign-policies-aregaining-popularity-and-increasing-peace [https://perma.cc/HV46-MTVL]. The article notes that in the
past few years, wealthy nations have increased funding for gender equality. See id. For example, from
2000 to 2014, Sweden quintupled its aid for funding gender equality in countries experiencing conflict.
Id.
28
Nisha Chittal, How Social Media Is Changing the Feminist Movement, MSNBC (published Mar.
26, 2015, 6:03 PM; updated Apr. 6, 2015, 11:09 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how-socialmedia-changing-the-feminist-movement [https://perma.cc/YYY3-5ZFN] (arguing that social media
campaigns have not only raised awareness but have also “generated tangible results” such as in the
ongoing “#StandWithPP” campaign, which began in 2012 as a way for Twitter users to champion
Planned Parenthood in the face of its anti-abortion critics).
29
Id. Chittal highlights both explicitly political protests, like the “#StandWithWendy” Twitter
campaign supporting State Representative Wendy Davis’s famous thirteen-hour filibuster at the Texas
State Capital in 2013, as well as stereotype-smashing campaigns like the “#AskHerMore” campaign
emphasizing the superficiality of traditional red-carpet questions asked to women and the
“#NotBuyingIt” campaign calling out sexism in Super Bowl advertisements. See id.
30
Kira Cochrane, The Fourth Wave of Feminism: Meet the Rebel Women, THE GUARDIAN (Dec.
10, 2013, 1:55 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/10/fourth-wave-feminism-rebelwomen [https://perma.cc/DQ94-7ZHC]. Cochrane wrote that in 2013, “a new swell [of feminism] built
up and broke through” and further pointed to local grassroots groups and Internet consciousness-raising
as examples, arguing that technology has allowed women to create a popular reactive movement online
that has encouraged new campaigns and protests. See id.
31
Bridget J. Crawford & Carla Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Human Rights, 2017
WIS. L. REV. 491, 493.
32
Id. at 491.
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why the tampon tax has now become a global issue: (1) there is an
increasing openness to discussing women’s bodies, (2) the Internet allows
for easy and quick communication, (3) the discriminatory financial effects
of the tax are easy to understand, and (4) the solution for discriminatory tax
regimes is relatively simple compared to some other forms of gender
discrimination. 33
But it is also important to situate activism against the tampon tax
within the history of feminist activism regarding tampon regulation and
labeling, as well as menstrual shaming, to better understand how the
resistance to the tampon tax is a modern piece of a decades-long endeavor
toward menstrual equity 34 in the United States.35 Additionally, there are
currently other branches of a movement for menstrual equity developing
alongside the protests against the tampon tax, including civil rights groups
pressuring U.S. educational and penal institutions to provide free tampons
to students and inmates; 36 start-up companies selling products like bloodabsorbing underwear and organic, nontoxic tampons and embracing
unapologetic and frank advertising; 37 and plenty of writers offering think
pieces arguing that tampon advertising is infantilizing and shaming of
periods 38 and that Instagram should not remove images of menstrual
blood. 39

33

Id. at 542.
The term menstrual equity was coined by attorney Jennifer Weiss-Wolf to “describe the notion
of what it means to consider the ability to manage menstruation in the context of full democratic and
civic participation.” Abigail Jones, Periods, Policy and Politics: Menstrual Equity Is the New Thing,
(May
8,
2017,
11:26
AM)
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted),
NEWSWEEK
www.newsweek.com/periods-policy-and-politics-menstrual-equity-new-thing-596027
[https://perma.cc/2DUH-URCZ].
35
For a great overview of the modern menstrual equity movement, see id.
36
See, e.g., Chandra Bozelko, Prisons that Withhold Menstrual Pads Humiliate Women and
Violate Basic Rights, THE GUARDIAN (June 12, 2015, 7:30 AM), https://wwww.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2015/jun/12/prisons-menstrual-pads-humiliate-women-violate-rights
[https://perma.cc/3JPY-LDTJ]; Melissa Jeltsen, Providing Free Pads and Tampons to Incarcerated
Women Is About More Than Hygiene: It’s a Question of Dignity, HUFFINGTON POST (published June
23, 2016, 3:00 PM; updated June 23, 2016), www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/new-york-prisonsperiods_us_576bfcade4b0b489bb0c901b [https://perma.cc/Y9JZ-DT4P].
37
See, e.g., Katie Richards, Ever Think About What’s in a Tampon? This Company’s Subway Ads
Start the Conversation: Lola Launches First Non-Digital Campaign, ADWEEK (May 15, 2017),
www.adweek.com/brank-marketing/ever-think-about-whats-in-a-tampon-this-companys-subway-adsstart-the-conversation [https://perma.cc/J5AP-W39d].
38
See, e.g., Saya Weissman, 5 Tampon Ads that Treat Women as Adults, DIGIDAY (Aug. 1, 2013),
https://digiday.com/marketing/5-awesome-tampon-ads [https://perma.cc/4ASG-C5PF].
39
See, e.g., Heather Saul, Instagram Apologises for Deactivating Photographer Harley Weir’s
Account After Pictures Showing Menstrual Blood, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 8, 2016, 4:36 PM),
www.independent.co.uk/people/instagram-deactivates-photographer-harley-weirs-account-aftershowing-menstrual-blood-a7232186.html [https://perma.cc/6SDW-N4JP] (discussing artists and
34
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Two themes underlie this short history of feminist tampon activism:
(1) activists’ focus on the health of women and on eliminating the cultural
taboo and expectation of shame and silence around women’s menstruation,
and (2) the federal government’s failure to take seriously the role tampons
play in women’s health, despite pressure from women’s health
organizations and consumer advocacy groups to increase transparency in
tampon regulation.
A. Tampon Regulation and Labeling Controversies 40
Though this Note focuses on the tax classification of tampons,
tampons’ regulatory classification has also garnered much controversy over
the years, and the tampon tax protests today can be viewed as stemming
from the movement against that classification. The relevant history begins
in the 1970s. Tampons were originally classified as cosmetic products for
regulatory purposes, but in 1976 the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) classified tampons as medical devices. 41 The intention of this
classification switch was to mandate the disclosure of ingredients used in
manufacturing tampons, as at the time all medical products had to list
ingredients on packaging, but cosmetics items did not.42 Somewhat
bizarrely, new legislation the following year reversed that mandate,
requiring cosmetic items but not medical items to list ingredients on
packaging, ultimately shielding tamponsas medical itemsfrom
requiring ingredient disclosure. 43

photographers who challenge Instagram’s bans and restrictions regarding depictions of menstrual
blood).
40
This is by no means a comprehensive history of tampons and tampon-related litigation in the
United States. Neither is it a thorough recounting of the feminist critiques of tampon manufacturing and
marketing and of societal views of menstruation. For more background and history, see generally
Crawford & Spivack, supra note 31, at 508 (arguing that the tampon tax and societal discomfort with
menstruation stems from “anxiety caused by the specter of a specifically female adult who cannot
control bodily effluvia”); Fetters, supra note 24 (describing the history of tampons in Western society
and in the United States specifically); Ashley Fetters & Eleanor Barkhorn, There Has to Be a Better
Way to Sell Tampons: Why Does So Much Marketing Center Around Candy and Infantilizing
ATLANTIC
(July
30,
2013),
Language?
Two
Editors
Discuss,
THE
https://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/07/there-has-to-be-a-better-way-to-selltampons/278197/ [https://perma.cc/9Y7M-8KRY] (discussing the infantilizing marketing of tampons);
Jamie Kohen, The History of the Regulation of Menstrual Tampons (Apr. 6, 2001) (unpublished class
paper) (on file with Harvard Law School library system), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn3:HUL.InstRepos:8852185 [https://perma.cc/YN4S-HM8J] (providing a history of tampon regulations
and litigation in the United States).
41
Fetters, supra note 20.
42
Id.
43
Crawford & Spivack, supra note 31, at 507.
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In 1975, one year before the FDCA’s enactment, Procter & Gamble
began manufacturing its extremely absorbent tampon called Rely. 44
Emerging during the time of the legislative classification switch up, Rely
escaped new testing requirements and ingredient disclosure. 45 By 1980,
investigators from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
published a report linking tampons to toxic shock syndrome (TSS),
suggesting a correlation between increased absorbency and risk of TSS.46
Procter & Gamble subsequently removed the ultra-absorbent Rely from the
market, 47 and the FDA asked manufacturers to voluntarily add a TSS
warning label to tampon boxes.48 After more research on tampons and TSS,
the FDA mandated that all tampon manufacturers provide a warning label
about the dangers of TSS and a package insert about the signs of TSS. 49
Importantly, however, these new FDA regulations failed to require the use
of standard terminology for absorbency levels, leaving women without an
informed way to choose between various tampons to minimize their risk of
TSS. 50
Women have consequently questioned the safety of feminine hygiene
products since the 1970s. 51 The women’s health movement, considered by
many scholars to be the “grandmother” of menstrual activism, became “a
recognizable force of social change along with the reemergence of the
feminist movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s.” 52 The movement
had a long and drawn-out fight for regulated and clearly defined
absorbency standards. The FDA first called a task force to develop
absorbency standards in 1981 but consequently continued to deny the need
for mandatory standardization of absorbency terms and instead asked
tampon manufacturers to note on tampon packaging that each individual
should use the most minimal absorbency level.53 In response to another
CDC study confirming the relationship between tampons with increased
44

Fetters, supra note 20.
Id.
46
Procter & Gamble Settles a Toxic Shock Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 1982),
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/25/us/procter-gamble-settles-a-toxic-shock-suit.html
[https://perma.cc/NCQ3-7YDS].
47
Studies showed a higher statistical correlation between TSS and Rely than for any other type of
tampon. Sharra L. Vostral, Rely and Toxic Shock Syndrome: A Technological Health Crisis, 84 YALE J.
BIOLOGY & MED. 447, 455, 457 (2011).
48
Kohen, supra note 40, at 7.
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Id. at 10.
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Id. at 12.
51
Chris Bobel, From Convenience to Hazard: A Short History of the Emergence of the Menstrual
Activism Movement, 1971–1992, 29 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 738, 740 (2008).
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absorbency and the risk of developing TSS, the FDA finally created an
absorbency label proposal in 1988—but it continued to delay enactment of
the rule. 54
Public Citizen, a national nonprofit consumer advocacy group, then
sued the FDA in 1989 for unnecessary delay in promulgating long-needed
regulations regarding tampon absorbency labels. 55 Others, including the
press, likewise criticized the FDA for its sluggishness on an issue crucial to
women’s health. 56 The district court judge in the Public Citizen lawsuit, for
instance, characterized the FDA as “lethargic in responding to and carrying
out its legal obligation and thus fail[ing] to adequately inform and protect
the public on this important health issue.” 57 In October 1989, the FDA
finally issued a reproposed rule stating that it would standardize the
existing absorbency terms. 58
Simultaneously, beginning as early as 1982, women’s activist groups
and medical organizations were pressuring the FDA to require ingredient
labeling for tampons. 59 Of particular concern was that consumers did not
have information about the amount of dioxins in tampons. An FDA
scientist validated this concern in 1987, noting that “[i]t is critical to an
adequate risk assessment that the level of dioxins in tampons, sanitary pads,
diapers, and other medical devices be measured.”60 Though the FDA
acknowledged consumer demand for tampon ingredient labeling in its
discussion of the 1989 reproposed rule for absorbency labeling, the FDA
cited the lack of evidence showing any allergies or adverse reactions to
tampon ingredients as a barrier preventing the FDA from having the
authority to enact such a rule. 61
Women continued to draw attention to the questionable safety of
tampons due to the government’s reluctance to increase regulation.
Journalist Karen Houppert questioned in a Village Voice article, and later in
a book, why menstruation was shrouded in secrecy. She suggested that the

54

Id. at 16–21.
Bobel, supra note 51, at 748 (adding that Public Citizen wanted “to force the FDA to require all
tampon manufacturers to print the numerical absorbency tampons and the information that high
absorbency puts women at higher risk of TSS on every box”).
56
See Kohen, supra note 40, at 20.
57
See id. (quoting Public Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Comm’r, FDA, 724 F. Supp. 1013, 1026
(D.D.C. 1989)).
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Id. at 22.
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See id. at 25–26.
60
Id. at 26 (citation omitted). The debate over dioxin continued into the 1990s. A 1990 study
partially authored by the FDA concluded that products like tampons containing bleached wood pulp did
not contain toxic levels of dioxin. See id. at 27.
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societal suppression of menstruation speech allowed tampon manufacturers
to operate opaquely. 62 In an attempt to push the government to lift the veil
on the safety of tampon ingredients and manufacturing, U.S.
Representative Carolyn B. Maloney spearheaded the Tampon Safety and
Research Act of 1997. 63 The Act would have mandated research on the
effects that dioxin and other synthetic fibers in tampons have on women’s
health, including whether they pose any risk for developing TSS.64
Representative Maloney has been bringing this legislation to Congress for
twenty years, but the Act has been blocked from going to a vote all nine
times. 65
At the same time, women’s health advocates outside of the United
States were concerned about tampon safety too. For instance, a feminist
environmentalist group called Women’s Environmental Network
coordinated with the BBC to broadcast a segment on the hazards of
chlorine-bleached paper products, including tampons. 66 Approximately
20% of U.K. residents saw the show, and viewers made over 50,000 calls
to manufacturers and members of the British Parliament to request that
manufacturers reduce dioxin pollution.67 Activism efforts in the United
States have been less effective at enacting satisfactory regulations for
62
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named after a young woman who died from TSS. Maloney, supra note 63. Maloney reintroduced her
bill (now H.R. 2379) once again in May 2017. Meanwhile, Representative Grace Meng (D-NY)
introduced the related Menstrual Equity for All Act (H.R. 972) in February 2017, which would improve
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(H.R. 2416) in May 2017. Maloney, supra note 63.
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Bobel, supra note 51, at 749.
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tampon businesses, and there has instead been a larger emphasis on
alternative products and alternative feminine hygiene businesses.68
Today, a clear inconsistency remains between how the federal
government and most state governments categorize tampons. It is a gaping
discrepancy that the federal government treats tampons like medical
products under FDA regulation—which keeps their ingredients and safety
levels shrouded in secrecy like prescription drugs—but that most states do
not likewise categorize tampons as medical products in their tax codes.
B. The Menstrual Equity Movement
In addition to activism against the tampon tax, there is the menstrual
equity movement, which aims to eliminate the stigma around menstruation
and ensure that periods do not act as a barrier to girls’ and women’s access
to education, health care, and other opportunities. 69 The movement is
predicated on the belief that menstrual hygiene is a public health issue and
that, particularly for poor and incarcerated women, “worrying about
bleeding through clothing or keeping up basic hygiene causes
psychological stress and a formidable barrier to employment and
education.” 70
The movement has garnered increasing amounts of attention. For
instance, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) drew attention to the
concept of menstrual equity in 2014 when it filed a lawsuit on behalf of
eight female inmates against Muskegon County jail in Michigan. 71 The
lawsuit alleged multiple inhumane policies in the jail, including that
inmates were “denied access to clean underwear and basic sanitary items
such as toilet paper and feminine hygiene products.” 72
The menstrual equity movement gained more steam in 2016 with the
unanimous passage of New York City Council legislation providing for the
placement of tampon and pad dispensers in all public schools that have any
female students in grades six through twelve, in prisons, and in homeless
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Prisons, and Shelters, SLATE (June 22, 2016, 5:50 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
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shelters within the jurisdiction.73 Emphasizing that tampons are not luxury
goods, Julissa Ferreras-Copelandthe council member who proposed the
legislationstated that “[m]enstrual hygiene products are as necessary as
toilet paper, and no one is freaking out about toilet paper.”74 The legislation
is the first of its kind, and New York State Assemblywoman Linda
Rosenthal promised to bring similar legislation forward at the state level.75
The accomplishments of the menstrual equity movement during the
last two years—in bringing attention to the concept of menstruation as a
public health issue and inspiring related legislation and litigation—is
promising for the future success of tampon regulation and taxation reform.
Contemporary tampon tax protesters build upon the work of the 1970s
activists who demanded transparency in tampon ingredients. Activists now
wage multiple fronts on the battle to persuade federal, state, and city
governments to take women’s menstrual health seriously.
II. LEGISLATIVE AND COURT-BASED REFORM EFFORTS
Most recently, we saw increasing efforts to banish the tampon tax at
the local and state level in the United States and at the national level abroad
in 2016. Prior to those resistance efforts, five out of the forty-five U.S.
states that collect sales tax already had exemptions for female hygiene
products, offering exemptions either through placing tampons and sanitary
napkins into an existing exemption category or by creating an additional
exemption explicitly for female hygiene products.76 For instance, Maryland
offers a sales tax exemption for “medicine and medical equipment,” which
includes a range of items from tampons and sanitary napkins to crutches,
corrective eyeglasses, and breastfeeding products and supplies. 77 Minnesota
and Massachusetts similarly exempt feminine hygiene products through a
“health products” exemption,78 while New Jersey created a sales tax
exemption specifically for feminine hygiene products. 79 Pennsylvania also
73
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(Apr.
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created a sales tax exemption covering “disposable diapers, incontinence
products, toilet paper, sanitary napkins, tampons or similar items used for
feminine hygiene.” 80
The first successful lawsuit to exempt feminine hygiene products from
sales tax, and the only judicial decision on the tampon tax to date, arose in
Illinois in 1989: Geary v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc. 81 Although the
Illinois legislature returned to taxing feminine hygiene products about two
decades later, the Chicago City Council and the Illinois state legislature
again worked to exempt them from sales tax in 2016.82
Illinois is not the only example of court-based challenges to the
tampon tax. Between 2015 and 2016, the United States saw a slew of civil
lawsuits and legislative endeavors to eliminate sales taxes on tampons and
other feminine hygiene products. These cases serve as examples for future
reform efforts and carry important lessons regarding how the tampon tax
can be successfully worked into existing exemption categories. Section II.A
examines Geary, the first and only U.S. judicial decision on the validity of
the tampon tax, which overturned the tax by comparing tampons to the
existing medical appliance exemptions. Section II.B demonstrates how
class action claims arguing that the tampon tax violated the state and
federal constitutions successfully spurred state legislatures to remove the
tax. Section II.C chronicles ongoing international reform efforts. Section
II.D illustrates the challenges to litigation.
A. Geary v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc. and Other Reform Efforts in
Illinois
In the 1989 case of Geary v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., a group of
female plaintiffs brought a class action suit against the City of Chicago and
various retailers alleging that the sales tax on tampons and other feminine
hygiene products was illegal under the Chicago Sales Tax Ordinance.83 The
Chicago Sales Tax Ordinance levied a sales tax but exempted medical
appliances from the tax. 84 Although the Ordinance itself did not define
medical appliances, an Illinois Department of Revenue regulation defined
80

061 PA. CODE § 9.2 (1991), http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/061/chapter9/s9.2.html
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See 544 N.E.2d 344, 355 (Ill. 1989).
82
See infra Section II.A.
83
See Geary, 544 N.E.2d at 345–46. To successfully claim damages, the plaintiffs had to overcome
the “voluntary-payment” doctrine, which states that one cannot recover taxes that one, knowing all the
facts, fully paid. Id. at 346. The plaintiffs successfully used the duress defense by contending that,
because the products are necessities with no substitutes, they had no choice but to pay the tax. Id. at
353.
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Id. at 353–54.
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medical appliances to include diapers and absorbent pads for
incontinence. 85 Furthermore, four years prior to the Geary decision, the
Illinois Department of Revenue had begun including tampons and other
feminine hygiene products in the medical appliances category for state
sales taxeseffectively eliminating the state tax on feminine hygiene
products−while the City of Chicago’s tax on feminine hygiene products
remained. 86
Rather than challenging the constitutionality of the City of Chicago’s
Ordinance or the Illinois regulations, the plaintiffs in Geary instead
challenged the City of Chicago’s interpretation of medical appliances. 87
Despite the fact that the Illinois Department of Revenue had explicitly
classified feminine hygiene products as medical products, the City of
Chicago and the various retailer defendants attempted to characterize
medical appliances as those that relate to illnesses.88 The defendants further
argued that since tampons are used in congruence with menstruation, a
“normal bodily function,” they should be considered merely hygienic and
not medical appliances.89
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, disagreed and ruled that
tampons were medical appliances. 90 The court noted that feminine hygiene
products executed absorbent functions similar to cotton and adhesive
bandages, which were already listed as medical appliances. 91 And so, for
nearly two decades, the City of Chicago did not tax feminine hygiene
products.
In 2009, the Department of Revenue for the State of Illinois issued
new regulations for its Retailers’ Occupation Tax for drugs, medicines,
medical appliances, and grooming and hygiene products.92 Under the new
regulations, prescription and nonprescription medicines, drugs, and medical
appliances were to be taxed at a 1% rate; “grooming and hygiene
products,” meanwhile, would be taxed at the “general merchandise rate” of
6.25%. 93 Feminine hygiene products were explicitly listed as grooming and
hygiene products at the state level.94
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The new regulation stated that pills, powders, salves, and other
products which were alleged to have “medicinal claims”—such as healing,
fighting infection, acting as a soaking aid for pain, stopping pain, curing
athlete’s foot, relieving muscular aches and pains, among others—could
qualify as a medical appliance at the low 1% tax rate.95
By March 2016, feminine hygiene products were taxed at a 10.25%
rate in Chicago. 96 This rate included the 1.25% Chicago city tax, the 6.25%
state sales tax, the 1.75% county tax, and the 1% regional transportation
authority tax. 97 On March 16, 2016, under pressure from the city’s women,
the Chicago City Council passed an ordinance again categorizing feminine
hygiene products as medical appliances and, thus, exempting them from the
city’s 1.25% sales tax. 98 However, the other tax layers remained, and so
Chicago City Council aldermen voted for a resolution requesting that the
Illinois General Assembly likewise exempt feminine hygiene products
from the state sales tax. 99 The General Assembly complied and created a
bill, which explicitly amended the relevant state statutes to exempt
menstrual pads, tampons, and menstrual cups. 100
Then, on August 19, 2016, Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner signed the
bill into law. 101 Illinois became the third state in 2016, after Connecticut
and New York, to eliminate the tampon tax. 102 The law took effect January
1, 2017. The series of events in Illinois demonstrates how public pressure
and bipartisan support at the state and city level can lead quickly to
elimination of the tampon tax. 103
B. Class Action Litigation Spurring Legislative Action in Other States
In New York, opponents of the tampon tax first attacked it through
litigation as opposed to political channels. In March 2016, five women filed
a class action lawsuit against the New York State Department of Taxation
and Finance alleging discriminatory taxation and violation of the Equal
95
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Protection Clause of both the New York constitution and the U.S.
Constitution. 104 The named plaintiff, Margo Seibert, was a cofounder of the
nonprofit group Racket, which Seibert started after a group of homeless
women emphasized their need for feminine hygiene products. The group is
dedicated to “exposing and eliminating menstrual taboos, and advocating
for equal access to menstrual hygiene products.”105
The lawsuit received a significant amount of press coverage, 106 and
before it could progress in court, the New York legislature acted. On May
25, 2016, the legislature approved Assembly Bill 7555, which eliminated
the tampon tax and instead classified feminine hygiene products with
medical products that are deemed to be necessities such as bandages,
medicine, and condoms. 107 Before signing the bill into law, Governor
Andrew Cuomo stated that “[r]epealing this regressive and unfair tax on
women is a matter of social and economic justice.” 108 The New York case
is a great example of how a class action lawsuit can attract media attention
and spur the public into lobbying their legislature to eliminate the tampon
tax, thereby eliminating the need for lawsuits to continue beyond the early
stages of litigation.
As of July 2017, three states—California, Florida, and Ohio—
currently face Equal Protection Clause violation claims based upon their
taxes on tampons and other feminine hygiene products.109
The plaintiffs in the California lawsuit sued the California State Board
of Equalization in August 2016, allegedly calling the tax “a vestige of an
antiquated patriarchal era when women were somehow considered unequal
to men.” 110 The Florida class action lawsuit likewise claims that the tax on
tampons discriminates against women and points out that hair-regrowth
104
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treatment is tax-exempt in Florida. 111 The plaintiff asked the judge to issue
an injunction to stop the state of Florida from collecting the tax and to give
women a rebate for the taxes they have paid on feminine hygiene products
for the last three years. 112 And in Ohio in March 2016, four women filed a
lawsuit in the Ohio Court of Claims against the Ohio Department of
Taxation, claiming Equal Protection Clause violations of both the Ohio
constitution and the U.S. Constitution. 113 Under the Ohio tax code,
prescription medicine and durable medical equipment are tax-exempt. 114
The plaintiffs, who were seeking class action status, sought not only the
end of the tax but also a “refund” of $66 million to Ohio tampon
purchasers. 115
Whether these lawsuits will reach the conclusion the Illinois Supreme
Court reached almost thirty years ago in Geary v. Dominick’s Finer Foods,
Inc. remains to be seen. Since all three lawsuits are still in the complaint
stage, their exact arguments demonstrating the illegality of the tampon tax
are still unknown.
While a bill proposed in June 2015 in the Ohio House of
Representatives would have abolished the state’s tampon tax, the likelihood
of it passing seems slim. The bill continues to sit in the ways and means
committee, where it was sent back in October 2015. 116 Other state
legislatures likewise made recent steps to eliminate their tax on feminine
hygiene products. For example, Connecticut successfully exempted
feminine hygiene products from sales tax in its budget-implementation bill,
which will go into effect on July 1, 2018.117 Additionally, in November
2016, the Council of the District of Columbia passed the Feminine Hygiene
and Diapers Sales Tax Exemption Amendment Act of 2016.118 Finally, as
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part of a tax-cut package, the Florida legislature made tampons, pads, and
menstrual products tax-free in May 2017, an act notably supported by
liberal and conservative lawmakers alike. 119
The above lawsuits and legislative attempts to end the tampon tax are
encouraging and demonstrate two important components of the larger
current push for menstrual equity and feminist activism generally. First,
activists such as tampon tax protesters are willing to go to the courts if
necessary. Second, so far, female—and not male—politicians have initiated
legislation to abolish the tampon tax, which underlines both the important
role female politicians play in equalizing the law and how the government
has traditionally failed to prioritize women’s needs.
C. International Reform Efforts
National efforts in Canada, France, and the United Kingdom have
successfully eliminated the national tax on tampons in each respective
country, demonstrating the menstrual equity movement’s global reach.
1.

Successful Tampon Tax Elimination in Canada, France, and the
United Kingdom
In contrast to stalled federal efforts in the United States, activists in
other countries have found success in pursing national reforms. For
example, pressure from Canadian citizens and legislative mobilization by
the New Democratic Party jointly pushed the Canadian federal government
to end its federal tax on tampons. 120 Feminine hygiene products in Canada
became tax-free on July 1, 2015, when the Department of Finance
announced that it was officially eliminating the 5% goods and services tax
and the harmonized sales tax previously levied on tampons and sanitary
napkins. 121 Seventy-five thousand people in Canada had signed a petition
demanding the end of the tax, which deemed feminine hygiene products as
“nonessential items” or “luxury goods,” while cake decorations and contact
lenses were exempt. 122
the council passes a bill in the District of Columbia, the bill is sent to the U.S. House of Representatives
and the U.S. Senate in order to become law.
119
Catherine Pearson, Florida Just Became the Latest State to Abolish the “Tampon Tax”: Well
Done!, HUFFINGTON POST (May 26, 2017, 11:14 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/floridajust-became-the-latest-state-to-abolish-the-tampon-tax_us_59282d4de4b0df34c35b77cf
[https://perma.cc/XX2L-BXLX].
120
Fekete, supra note 10.
121
Tara Culp-Ressler, After Years of Backlash, Canada Ditches the “Tampon Tax,” THINK
PROGRESS (May 29, 2015), https://thinkprogress.org/after-years-of-backlash-canada-ditches-thetampon-tax-ed5cd867fbf4#.96xdrf1v4 [https://perma.cc/9PMT-2S7G].
122
Id.; see also Petition, Government of Canada—No Tax on Tampons: A Campaign to Remove the
GST Charged on Menstruation Products, CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/no-tax-on-tampons-
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The French effort to abolish the tampon tax was less straightforward.
Socialist Members of Parliament introduced the legislation as an
amendment to the 2016 budget. 123 The amendment would bring the Value
Added Tax (VAT) placed on feminine hygiene products down from 20% to
5.5%. 124 Like plaintiffs and legislators in the United States, the French
Members of Parliament pushing for the amendment also argued that
tampons, sanitary napkins, and menstrual cups were “basic needs” and thus
should not be taxed at a luxury-goods rate. 125 In October 2016, the
government rejected the proposal for reasons similar to those given by
Governor Jerry Brown, who vetoed proposed legislation in California 126: it
claimed that had the amendment succeeded, tax revenues would have
decreased by 55 million Euros (63 million USD). 127 The public outcry was
significant, with “#taxetampon” 128 trending in Paris on Twitter the day after
the amendment was rejected. 129 A focal point of public criticism was the
comment made by Christian Eckert, French Minister of State for the
Budget, who compared tampons to men’s shaving foam. 130 He then
insinuated that though some members of the public are passionate about
ending the tampon tax, the issue is more complicated than they realize.131
Women’s groups protested and emphasized that feminine hygiene products
should be treated under the law equally to other necessity items like food
and condoms. 132 Likely in response to public pressure, Prime Minister
Manuel Valls said that the French government had the funds to absorb lost
revenue from the tax cut. 133 The National Assembly voted again on the
amendment, and it passed in December 2015.134

a-campaign-to-remove-the-gst-charged-on-menstruation-products-sign-the-petition
[https://perma.cc/N6MX-8B76].
123
France Rejects “Tampon Tax” Change, BBC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34538672 [https://perma.cc/7XLS-U5AM].
124
Id.
125
See id.
126
See Wadsworth, supra note 110 and text accompanying infra note 150.
127
France Rejects “Tampon Tax” Change, supra note 123.
128
French for tampon tax. See CASSELL’S FRENCH–ENGLISH, ENGLISH–FRENCH DICTIONARY 709,
712 (Denis Girard ed., 1977) (defining “tampon” and “taxe”).
129
France Rejects “Tampon Tax” Change, supra note 123.
130
Id. One Twitter user tweeted, “And beards and menstruation are basically the same thing,
right?—French Parliament, apparently.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Another challenged
Eckert to go a month without shaving while she would go a month without tampons so that they could
compare the results. Id.
131
See id.
132
Tampon Tax: France MPs Back VAT Cut on Sanitary Products, supra note 11.
133
See id.
134
Id.
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The French reduction from having a 20% VAT on feminine hygiene
products to 5.5% brings it in line with the current VAT on feminine
hygiene products in the United Kingdom. 135 The U.K. VAT on feminine
hygiene products has been at 5% since a 2001 campaign to lower the
tampon tax. 136 The British government went even further, however, by
lobbying the European Commission to banish the tampon tax altogether,
which EU law currently requires to be at a rate of at least 5%.137 The
European Commission mandates a minimum 5% VAT on feminine hygiene
products because it does not classify them as “essential,” unlike condoms
and razors, which are categorized as “essential” and thus are not
mandatorily taxed. 138 As the British government was waiting to see if the
European Union would allow it to remove the tampon tax altogether,
Chancellor George Osborne announced in his 2015 Autumn Statement that
the money raised by the 5% VAT on feminine hygiene products would go
to women’s charities.139 As of May 2016, the European Commission said it
would enact laws to enable member states to reduce or abolish their taxes
on feminine hygiene products, but no such laws have been enacted at the
time of this writing. 140 Thus, as it stands, EU citizens who want to abolish
the tampon tax in any of the EU member states must lobby the entire EU,
which is a high bar to overcome. Time will tell whether the post-Brexit
United Kingdom will still be tied to EU regulations on this issue and, if not,
whether the it will move forward with abolishing the tax.
2. The Tampon Tax Lives on in Australia
Efforts to abolish the tampon tax in Australia have been less
successful. As in some American states, in Australia products like condoms
and sunscreen are deemed “necessities” exempt from the national goodsand-services tax, while feminine hygiene products are considered “nonessential” and face a 10% goods-and-services tax. 141 The characterization of
tampons and sanitary pads as non-essential items may seem like a lower
135

Jon Stone, French Parliament Votes to Cut “Tampon Tax” VAT on Women’s Sanitary
(Dec.
15,
2015,
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PM),
Products,
INDEPENDENT
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/french-parliament-votes-to-cut-tampon-tax-vat-onwomens-sanitary-products-a6773676.html [https://perma.cc/Y6LH-BZG6/].
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
See Nick Gutteridge, EU Denies MP’s Claims It Has “Dropped” Osborne’s Agreement to
(May
26,
2016,
2:00
AM),
Exempt
UK
from
Tampon
Tax,
EXPRESS
http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/673665/EU-referendum-George-Osborne-Brexit-tampon-taxJohn-Redwood [https://perma.cc/6VDB-Y4CC].
141
“Tampon Tax”: Australia Decides Not [sic] Remove Controversial Levy, supra note 12.
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bar to overcome than the medical appliances category often used in U.S.
states and in other countries. Australia’s historical practice requires,
however, that all state and territory governments agree before any changes
to the goods-and-services tax can be made, despite not being a
constitutional requirement.142 After a petition demanding the end of the
tampon tax reached over 103,000 signatures,143 Australian state treasurers
considered the issue at a treasurers’ meeting in August 2015, but like the
legislative decisions in California and France, decided not to make any
changes to the classifications of tampons, citing that the estimated tax
revenue losses would be around 22 million U.S. Dollars. 144 At least one
Australian activist believes it may take years to abolish the Australian
tampon tax, because both houses in Parliament must approve of the
necessary legislative changes. 145
The recent proliferation of global action to eliminate the tampon tax in
so many different countries underscores how important this issue is to
women and activists all around the world.
D. Challenges to Litigation
1.

When Revenue Concerns Outweigh Equality: The California
Example
The movement in California to abolish the tampon tax in 2016
followed the opposite trajectory as that in New York—first there were
legislative efforts followed by a lawsuit—with a very different result: the
tampon tax survived. First came Assembly Bill 1561, proposed by a
bipartisan duo of female assembly members, which would have created an
explicit exemption for “sanitary napkins” and “tampons.” 146 Medical
devices and prescription drugs, like Viagra, were already exempt. 147 Had
this Bill succeeded, feminine hygiene products including tampons, sanitary

142

Id.
Subeta Vimalarajah, Petition, To: Australia’s 8 State and Territory Treasurers: Stop Taxing My
RUN,
https://www.communityrun.org/petitions/stop-taxing-my-period
Period!,
COMMUNITY
[https://perma.cc/UZ3A-H9KP].
144
“Tampon Tax”: Australia Decides Not to Remove Controversial Levy, supra note 12.
145
Tegan Taylor, Australia’s Tampon Tax Changes Years Away Despite Changes in Chicago, UK,
Activist Says, AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING CORP. NEWS (Aug. 11, 2016, 4:05 PM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-03-18/tampon-tax-changes-in-chicago-uk-australia-will-lagactivist/7257146 [https://perma.cc/8PD4-5WC6].
146
AB-1561, 2015−16 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1561 [https://perma.cc/5QAX-DMYB].
147
Anna North, Jerry Brown’s Disappointing Tampon Tax Decision, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2016,
2:21 PM), https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/jerry-browns-disappointing-tampon-taxdecision [https://perma.cc/7YDJ-SSCS].
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napkins, and menstrual cups would have been untaxed through 2022.148
Despite some opposing assembly members’ contention that the 100
existing exemptions were too many already, the Bill passed the state
legislature unanimously in August 2016. 149 However, in September 2016,
Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the Bill, along with six other tax bills, saying
the legislature was not the proper venue for making tax decisions.150
Instead, he said that such “tax breaks . . . should be considered during
budget deliberations so that all spending proposals are weighed against
each other at the same time.” 151
Less than three months after Governor Brown’s veto, 152
Assemblymember Cristina Garcia, a cosponsor of the vetoed Bill,
introduced another bill that would eliminate the tax on tampons in
California. 153 Although the new bill would effect the same “budget
constraint” as the prior one (approximately $20 million annually), Garcia
hoped that the increased national momentum against the tampon tax, as
well as a pending California lawsuit contending that the tampon tax
violates the Equal Protection Clause, would make a difference.154 As of
July 2017, the new bill had been referred to the senate appropriations
suspense file, 155 where it will be eligible for a rehearing during the second
year of the legislative session, and the lawsuit was in the pleadings stage. 156

148
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AB-1561
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB156 [https://perma.cc/5QAX-DMYB].
149
North, supra note 147.
150
Wadsworth, supra note 110 (quoting Jerry Brown as saying that “[t]ax breaks . . . are the same
as new spending” and should be decided in budget deliberations). In response, Assemblymember
Cristina Garcia, a Democrat who cosponsored the bill, said that “[s]aying that the measure should have
been put in the budget is just side-stepping the fact that we shouldn’t be balancing the budget off half of
the population.” North, supra note 147.
151
Jacqueline Burte Cote, Yet Another Politician Mansplains Why Tampons & Diapers Should Be
Taxed, CAFEMOM (Sept. 13, 2016, 6:06 PM), http://thestir.cafemom.com/politics_views/200584/
yet_another_politician_mansplains_why [https://perma.cc/G63V-92RB]; see also Sharon Bernstein,
California Governor Vetoes Bill to Repeal Tampon Tax, REUTERS (Sept. 13, 2016, 6:21 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-tampon-idUSKCN11J2QK
[https://perma.cc/UU5T9MRD].
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See Bernstein, supra note 151.
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Mollie Reilly, The Fight Against the Tampon Tax Gets New Life in California, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 5, 2016, 8:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/california-tampontax_us_5845fe51e4b055b31398fb7f [https://perma.cc/5SAW-Y9PR].
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See id.
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A.B. 9, 2016−17 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017), https://legiscan.com/CA/bill/AB9/2017
[https://perma.cc/N7FT-TBLT].
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Register of Actions, DiSimone v. California (Cal. Super. Ct. July 18 2017) (No. CGC-16552458),
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So even when eliminating the tampon tax has public and legislative
support, government leaders may act to block its elimination,
demonstrating the need for litigation as the vehicle to eliminate the tax in
those situations. Even some liberal politicians, like Democratic Governor
Jerry Brown, are satisfied with the revenue justification for taxing health
products required by women.
2. Resistance to Eliminating Taxes on Feminine Hygiene Products
The resistance to eliminating municipal, state, and national taxes (such
as in Canada and France) on feminine hygiene products is rooted in two
primary arguments: first, that feminine hygiene products are not
necessities, and second, that states cannot afford to lose the guaranteed
revenue from taxes on tampons.
The belief that tampons and sanitary pads should not be categorized as
a necessity is illustrated by the French Minister of State for the Budget’s
perhaps misguided attempt to compare tampons to men’s shaving cream, a
luxury in France with a VAT of 20%. 157 A less offensive line of reasoning
is what the City of Chicago argued in the 1989 Geary case: that tampons
and pads are not medical appliances but are purely used for hygiene.158
True, the distinction between medical appliance and hygiene product may
be subtle, especially depending on how a tax code defines each category.
But both these arguments rely on a misunderstanding of, or a lack of
concern about, basic female biology and contradict how medical
associations characterize tampons as a medical necessity. 159
Joseph Henchman, the overseer of state policy for the think tank Tax
Foundation, also argues that “necessity is subjective,” implying that there is
no clear single definition of a necessity.160 While this may be true, so long
as there are tax-exempt categories based upon the idea that some items
deserve to be tax-exempt because they are so essential to people’s lives,
there will and should be debate about what items should be placed into
such exempt categories. 161 Furthermore, there are normative justifications
for determining that tampons and feminine hygiene products are necessary
157

See France Rejects “Tampon Tax” Change, supra note 123.
Geary v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 544 N.E.2d 344, 355 (Ill. 1989).
159
See Press Release, American Medical Association, AMA Adopts New Policies on Final Day of
Annual Meeting, (June 15, 2016) (stating that “[f]eminine hygiene products are essential for women’s
health”),
https://www.ama-assn.org/ama-adopts-new-policies-final-day-annual-meeting
[https://perma.cc/WUP2-XRTU].
160
Josh Barro, The Latest Sales Tax Controversy: Tampons, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Jan. 7,
2016)
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/upshot/the-latest-sales-tax-controversy-tampons.html
[https://perma.cc/294Q-MEFG]. Henchman notes that “nuanced arguments about what constitutes
necessity have often led to very complicated sales tax rules.” Id.
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products, such as that their use helps to prevent disease and infection.162
There are also comparative arguments that arise by, for example, looking at
the currently tax-exempt items and establishing how feminine hygiene
products are more or equally essential to basic human needs as items like
frosting or Band-Aids. 163
Other resistance stems from the reluctance to lose the revenue brought
to a state or city through the tampon tax and often coupled with the
argument that the tax codes are already overly complicated.164 Those
especially concerned about generating state or federal revenue from sales
tax defend the tampon tax as a way to ensure tax revenue in a slow
economy: the more products that are exempted from sales tax, the more the
state must rely on tax revenue from restaurant meals and “durables” like
consumer electronics and home appliances.165 Yet since consumers cut back
on eating out and buying these durable goods during a weak economy, the
state risks a low tax-revenue stream if it does not continue to receive
revenue from more necessary products, like feminine hygiene products.166
Yet this argument that the tampon tax is justified because consumers
will consistently buy tampons even in a poor economy reveals that tampons
are indeed a necessity. If legislatures are reluctant to eliminate the tax due
to budget concerns and revenue loss, the best hope for overturning the
tampon tax may be through filing a lawsuit, as the California case
demonstrates. 167
III. INTERMEDIATE AND EXACTING SCRUTINY ANALYSIS
For a plaintiff to succeed in demonstrating that the tampon tax is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, a court must find,
through an intermediate scrutiny analysis, that the tax is discriminatory and
does not further an important government interest via a means that is
substantially related to that interest. Section III.A provides an overview of
the Equal Protection Clause, Section III.B traces the development of the
intermediate scrutiny analysis for sex-based classifications, and Section
III.C highlights the traditional analysis of tax claims under the Equal
Protection Clause. At bottom, this Section provides the legal framework for
a challenge to the tampon tax under the Equal Protection Clause.

162
163
164
165
166
167
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A. The Equal Protection Clause: An Overview
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause provides that
no state shall “deny to any persons within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” 168 The Supreme Court has interpreted this Clause to
guarantee that people who are similarly situated will be treated equally
under the law; however, the Court allows for differential treatment when
there are relevant distinctions between individuals or among groups. 169
Thus, a plaintiff bringing an equal protection claim will have a stronger
case if she can demonstrate that she is the same as, or is similarly situated
to, the individuals or groups to which she compares herself. It is rare,
however, for the Court to explicitly analyze whether a plaintiff with an
equal protection claim is actually similarly situated to the others from
whom the plaintiff is allegedly being treated differently. 170 Rather, the
Court tends to focus its analysis on whether the plaintiff belongs to a
“suspect classification” and, if so, to what extent the law in question
upholds or relates to a legitimate government interest.171
The Court’s analysis of equal protection claims occurs within a
framework of a general deference to the legislature but becomes a “more
searching judicial inquiry” when the law impedes individual rights or
discriminates against a minority group. 172 The level of judicial scrutiny
depends upon what “suspect classification” the plaintiff falls into. 173 Over
time, the Court has identified three levels of scrutiny: rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. 174 The floor for equal protection
claims is the rational basis test, which requires the government to show that
the statute is reasonably related to a government interest.175 Under this test,

168

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine?,
43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1079 (2011).
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and the Requirement of “Similarly Situated,” 51 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 595, 610 (2006) (“[I]n most . . .
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Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 169, at 1079.
172
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
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Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 169, at 1079. Indeed, the categorization of the plaintiff into
a suspect category is so imperative in equal protection cases that the results “will almost always depend
on the ability to convince a court that there is a racial or gender classification present or discrimination
with regard to a fundamental right.” Id.
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governmental actions are usually upheld. 176 On the other hand, if the
plaintiff is treated differently due to a racial classification, then the Court
will apply a strict scrutiny analysis, and the government must show that the
statute is “narrowly tailored” to support a “compelling” government
interest. 177 The strict scrutiny analysis is the highest tier of scrutiny that the
Court applies for equal protection claims, and rarely does the Court uphold
a statute when applying strict scrutiny. 178
Until 1976, these were the only two tiers of scrutiny used in equal
protection claims, and as sex was not yet deemed a suspect category, civil
rights groups led by then-professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that sex
classifications should be analyzed under strict scrutiny just like racial
classifications were. 179
B. Development of the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard for Sex
Classifications
A series of Supreme Court decisions has outlined the somewhat
ambiguous level of scrutiny needed for sex discrimination cases. The Court
first extended the Equal Protection Clause to apply to sex discrimination in
1971 in Reed v. Reed. 180 Prior to this case, the Court had never struck down
a sex-based law as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.181 The Reed
Court held that an Idaho law specifying that men were to be preferred to
women in the appointment of estate administrators was an “arbitrary
preference” that did not stand up to the demands of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 182 The state’s reasoning for the law was purely
administrative—to reduce the workload of probate courts when faced with
two potential estate administrators of different sexes—which the Court
conceded to be a legitimate objective but one too arbitrary to be upheld
under the Equal Protection Clause.183 The Reed Court neither explained
why it decided to use a stricter standard than the usual rational basis test it

176
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between the sexes.” Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948); see also Williams, supra note 183, at
42 (demonstrating the feminist legal efforts to get the Court to view sex as a strict scrutiny category and
noting that in Reed, “for the first time in its history, [the Court] str[uck] down a gender-line in law as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
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Reed, 404 U.S. at 74.
183
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had previously used for sex discrimination equal protection claims nor
articulated the standard it used in this case, other than to note that the Idaho
law was subject to “scrutiny.” 184 This standard, now known as
“intermediate scrutiny,” but not identified as such until five years later in
Craig v. Boren, 185 lives somewhere in the gap between the low-level
rational basis tier and the strict scrutiny tier.186 The Court seemed to be
applying a formal equality approach, finding that for two comparable
candidates for estate administrator, sex cannot be deemed a preferential
factor, so long as the state’s means for doing so are “arbitrary.” 187
After Reed, feminist legal scholars, led by Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
continued to push for a clarified strict scrutiny classification for sex
discrimination cases. 188 In Frontiero v. Richardson, a plurality opinion by
Justice William Brennan did find that sex classifications should be
examined with strict scrutiny; but, without the necessary five-Justice
majority, it did not become controlling law.189 The law at issue in Frontiero
allowed a serviceman to claim his wife as a “dependent” to obtain
increased health and living benefits without proof that the wife relied on
her husband for support. 190 But for a married servicewoman to claim her
husband as a “dependent,” she had to submit proof demonstrating not only
that he did in fact rely on her for economic support but also that he relied
on her for over half of his support. 191
The district court hypothesized that the legislature created the law to
reflect the societal norm that men are “breadwinner[s]” while women are
“typically the ‘dependent’ partner”; thus, for administrative reasons, the
184

Id. at 75.
429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976).
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Classifications: Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 15 AKRON L. REV. 595, 597 (1982)
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to a strict scrutiny approach, but without the demand for a compelling state interest.”).
187
Formal equality is the view that “the law should combat discrimination against similarly
situated equals. According to this view, women ought to enjoy all the rights and privileges afforded to
men, and no more . . . . The call to formal equality required advocates to downplay certain biological
and socially constructed differences between the sexes. In the process, proponents of formal equality
articulated an intuitively attractive, justice-oriented appeal: treat each sex the same, and women will
prosper.” Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, (Un)Equal Protection: Why Gender Equality Depends on
Discrimination, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2015) (footnotes omitted). For more on formal equality, see
Williams, supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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Williams, supra note 179, at 41. At the time, Ginsburg was a Professor of Law at Columbia
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80.” Id.
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lower court found that it was reasonable to assume that men’s wives really
were dependent but require proof for women alleging dependent
husbands. 192 Justice Brennan’s four-Justice opinion rejected stereotypes
about women’s capabilities and noted both women’s historical inequality
and Congress’s deepening adversity to sex-based classifications. 193
Importantly, the Court stated that if the government objective was to
exclude or protect one sex based upon a perceived innate handicap or
inferiority, then the government objective was illegitimate. 194 As in Reed,
the Court found that the government’s administrative justification was
insufficient to find the law valid; but here, the Court further said that the
government’s purpose for the law was not sufficient “in order to satisfy the
demands of strict judicial scrutiny.” 195 A three-Justice concurrence,
however, disagreed that characterizing sex as a suspect classification was
necessary, arguing that the Reed definition was authority and that the Court
should not preempt legislative authority, since the Equal Rights
Amendment was then being submitted to the states for ratification. 196
Again, as in Reed, the Court used a formal-equality approach to strike
down facially unequal laws. 197
Feminists continued to advocate for a strict scrutiny analysis of sexbased classifications. But in 1976, the Court again failed to reach the
necessary fifth vote for strict scrutiny in Craig v. Boren, 198 in which the
Court instead articulated the level of scrutiny known as intermediate
scrutiny. 199 In Craig, the Court used a formal-equality approach200 to find
192
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[S]tate law in Reed presumed that men controlled capital [while] the armed services rule in
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that limited women’s advancement. In each case, the Court mandated formal equality not as a
means unto itself but as part of the larger objective of dismantling gender hierarchies.
Id.
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Id. at 218 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that in this case, the Court applied “an elevated or
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Williams, supra note 179 at 43–44. Williams describes the formal-equality approach as one that
views “discrimination against men and women as equally reprehensible in the same way some
conservative justices viewed discrimination against white people as the moral and legal equivalent of
discrimination against minorities.” Id.
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that a sex-based distinction regarding the age at which one could buy
alcohol was unconstitutional. 201 The government’s justification was based
on an argument the Court characterized as “statistically measured but
loose-fitting generalities concerning the drinking tendencies of aggregate
groups.” 202 Though the Court said that previous cases had established that
sex classifications must serve “important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives,” this was in fact
the first time that the Court articulated this loose-fitting generalities
standard for sex classifications. 203
Since the Court’s articulation of intermediate scrutiny in Craig v.
Boren, a challenged government action or objective can only survive if the
state’s action is substantially related to an important governmental
objective, meaning that the government must not only demonstrate
meaningful differences between men and women but must also have an
adequate governmental objective that justifies this differential treatment.
Yet the Court has at times requested more than merely a substantial relation
to a governmental objective, leading some observers to believe that the
proper level of scrutiny for sex discrimination lies somewhere between
intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. 204 Many also believe that sexbased discrimination should be treated with the same level of scrutiny as
race-based discrimination: strict scrutiny. 205
The Court has suggested that for sex-based discrimination, the proper
level of scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny with teeth: essentially, the area
between intermediate and strict scrutiny. For example, in Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, 206 the Court held that the state or other
proponent of the challenged state action must show an “exceedingly
persuasive justification” for using a sex-based classification. 207
Furthermore, the Court has emphasized that it has some discretion when
scrutinizing the government’s alleged objectives. In Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 208 for instance, the Court contended that it does not need to
accept the government’s distillation of the alleged legislative purpose but

201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 197; see also Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 169, at 1079.
Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 169, at 1079.
Id.
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
Id. at 724 (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)).
420 U.S. 636 (1975).
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will examine the legislative history to assess what the goal of the
legislation may have been. 209
Together, then, at minimum any litigation against a state’s tax on
feminine hygiene products based upon the Equal Protection Clause will at
least implicate intermediate scrutiny analysis.
C. Traditional Analysis of Tax Claims Under the Equal Protection Clause
Assessing whether the tampon tax is unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause may require another level of analysis in addition to the
intermediate scrutiny analysis: a consideration of the Court’s treatment of
tax cases under the Equal Protection Clause. The flexibility offered to
lawmakers with respect to taxes presents a significant obstacle for
challenging the tampon tax. The Court uses a rational basis approach to
state tax laws, unless they deal with a historically marginalized group, and
thus generally gives the state discretion to enact its tax legislation as it
pleases. As tax systems have a strong presumption of constitutionality, 210
rarely has the Court found that a tax law violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 211
As in many areas of the law, tax codes ranging from the federal
Internal Revenue Code to state- or city-based property tax laws have
historically allowed some sex-based classifications, largely premised on
gender stereotypes and expectations. Oftentimes, the Court has justified the
upholding or removal of a tax based upon normative ideas about women’s
position within families and the domestic sphere. For example, in early
alimony cases, the Court’s decisions were based upon “the natural and
legal duty of the husband to support the wife.” 212 In Gould v. Gould, for
209
Id. at 648 (“But the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic
shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.”); see
also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“The justification must be genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”).
210
See Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526–27 (1959) (“The States have a
very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes . . . . The State may impose different specific taxes upon
different trades and professions and may vary the rate of excise upon various products. It is not required
to resort to close distinctions or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference to
composition, use, or value.”).
211
See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (“[I]n taxation, even more than in other fields,
legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification. Since the members of a legislature
necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which this Court cannot have, the presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a
hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes. The burden is on the one
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”
(footnotes omitted)).
212
Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 577 (1901).
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instance, the Court held that the payments a husband made to his ex-wife
should not be taxed as part of the ex-wife’s income tax, which encouraged
the view that women existed in a dependent state to men. 213 Though most
current tax regimes tend to be at least facially neutral toward sex-based
classifications, scholars still contend that they demonstrate gender bias in
estate taxation,214 statutory interpretation of tax laws by courts, 215
pensions, 216 and the joint income tax return. 217 Evidently, a formal-equality
approach may not suffice to overturn such facially neutral laws.218
Likely due to the deference the Court generally gives to the states to
develop their own tax codes, there have been few tax cases that have
alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause; there have been
especially few that also involve sex classifications. In addition to meeting
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, some scholars have also
contended that a tax must meet the horizontal-equity requirements
grounded in the Uniformity Clause, which directs that taxes “shall be
uniform throughout the United States.” 219 The Supreme Court, however,
has interpreted the Uniformity Clause to signify only geographic
uniformity. 220 Furthermore, since most tax-based equal protection claims
213

245 U.S. 151, 154 (1917).
See Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: “The Kingdom of the Fathers,” 10 LAW & INEQ.
137, 150 (1991) (illustrating how modern estate planning law and practice “contains the same notions
concerning married women’s limited right to maintenance and the manifestation of fatherhood through
property and inheritance that were present in the fourteenth century”).
215
See Gwen Thayer Handelman, Sisters in Law: Gender and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes,
3 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 60–61 (1993) (arguing that the “every-man-for-himself” approachgiving
the taxpayer the freedom to make any decision that does not interfere with the rights of othersto
statutory ambiguity disadvantages women because of the difference in power that men and women
possess in the private sphere).
216
See generally Vicki Gottlich, The Tax Reform Act of 1986: Does It Go Far Enough to Achieve
Pension Equity for Women?, 4 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 19–20 (1988) (examining the effects of the
private pension laws on the economic status of older women, highlighting how these laws impact
women differently than men, and suggesting what can be done to ensure that more women receive
meaningful economic benefits from their pension plans).
217
See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint
Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 64 (1993) (arguing that the joint income tax return penalizes
the second worker when two individuals live together, thus discouraging “married couples from having
a second earner (usually the wife), putting both psychological and economic stress on these families, on
the wife in particular”).
218
See Beverly I. Moran, From Urinal to Manicure: Challenges to the Scholarship of Tax and
Gender, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 221, 226 (2000) (“[B]ecause we are in the post-20th century feminist
era, at least in tax legislation and judicial decisions, I think we can no longer rely on language alone to
reveal bias. We are going to have to deal with neutral tax language and uncover whatever bias exists
within that neutral language.”).
219
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
220
See Stephen W. Mazza & Tracy A. Kaye, Restricting the Legislative Power to Tax in the United
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 641, 656 (2006); see also, e.g., Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 361
214
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would be analyzed only at a rational basis levelunless the claim involved
another element that would trigger intermediate or strict scrutinythe
government typically has had to overcome only a low barrier in
demonstrating its interest.221 Because the purpose of taxation is to raise
revenue, virtually any tax could be found to have a rational basis related to
that legitimate interest.
The Court’s tax-related Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence has
suggested that the Court will consider whether the sex-based tax could have
been classified differently, without implicating sex, and also whether that
sex-based classification is clearly tied to a legitimate government interest.
Where the classification is tied to a legitimate government interest, the
Court has also considered whether that interest is based on sex
stereotyping, in which case the law may be overturned, or whether it is tied
to overcoming historical inequalities, in which case the law may be upheld.
Equal protection claims based on discriminatory sex classifications have
defeated tax laws in a few instances. For example, in Moritz v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 222 the Tenth Circuit found
unconstitutional a law that allowed women an income tax deduction for
dependent-care expenses, regardless of their marital status, but denied it to
men who had never married. 223 The court rejected the government’s
justification that since women had lower paying jobs, it was rational to
broaden their ability to deduct for dependent care.224 Instead, the court said
that if it were truly the government’s objective to grant relief to people in
low-income brackets who have dependents, it could have created such a
category instead of using sex as the deciding tool. 225 But in Kahn v.
Shevin, 226 which the Court decided only a year after the Tenth Circuit
decided Moritz, the Court found constitutional a Florida law providing
widows, but not widowers, a $500 tax exemption under the Equal
Protection Clause, citing discrimination against women in a male-

(1945) (affirming that the Uniformity Clause “requires only that what Congress has properly selected
for taxation must be identically taxed in every state where it is found”); United States v. Ptasynski,
462 U.S. 74, 84 (1983) (holding that Congress’s decision to treat Alaskan oil as a separate class of oil
does not violate the Uniformity Clause because neither “the language of the [Uniformity] Clause [n]or
this Court’s decisions prohibit all geographically defined classifications . . . [so long as] an excise tax
appl[ies], at the same rate, in all portions of the United States where the subject of the tax is found.”).
221
Eleanor Chote Jewart, Note, The Difficulty of Equal Protection Challenges to Tax
Classifications: Peden v. State, 3 ST. & LOC. TAX L. 155, 159 (1998).
222
469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972).
223
Id. at 470.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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dominated workforce and women’s usual economic dependency on their
spouses as “a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”227
One way to reconcile the different outcomes of these two similar
statutes is that in Kahn, the objective of the statute was specifically to
correct for economic obstacles women faced, whereas in Moritz, the
objective could have been realized without a gendered basis and the state
was possibly relying too much on reducing an administrative burden by
using gender as a proxy for income. In this way, it seems that using sexbased classifications in a tax code or regulation may be constitutional under
a power-inequality lens but not when it seems to be a somewhat arbitrary
placeholder for reducing administrative work. Thus, although the Court
does strongly weigh the state’s interest in taxation when examining taxrelated equal protection claims, it has also set precedent for consideration
of how the tax relates to historical inequity. Additionally, the state may not
justify its goal of obtaining tax revenue by use of sex classification when its
main justification is administrative ease.
IV. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY ANALYSIS OF THE TAMPON TAX
In analyzing whether the tampon tax violates the Equal Protection
Clause, a court would have to determine whether the tax is discriminatory
and, if so, whether the state’s justification for the tax is sufficiently related
to the use of a sex-based tax. To assist in encouraging and supporting
litigation against the tampon tax, Section IV.A first highlights the
disproportionate effects the tampon tax has on women and Section IV.B
then analyzes how the governments’ two main justifications for the tax are
arbitrary and not sufficiently tied to the governmental goal of increasing
revenue.
A. The Tampon Tax Is Discriminatory and Has Disproportionately
Adverse Effects on Women
The first hurdle in mounting an equal protection claim is to
demonstrate that the law in question disproportionately and adversely
affects women. 228 The tampon tax is discriminatory in three main ways: (1)
227
Id. at 355 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)) (“We deal here with a state tax law
reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon
the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden.”).
228
See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (“When a statute gender-neutral
on its face is challenged on the ground that its effects upon women are disproportionably adverse, a
twofold inquiry is . . . appropriate. The first question is whether the statutory classification is indeed
neutral in the sense that it is not gender-based. If the classification itself, covert of [sic] overt, is not
based upon gender, the second question is whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based
discrimination.”).
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it is a tax on a sex-based product, (2) it places a unique economic burden
on biological women, and (3) it is based on stereotyping and
misunderstandings about female biology. Furthermore, the continued
existence of the tax in thirty-eight states exemplifies its discriminatory
nature by evidencing governments’ failure to prioritize women’s needs
First, the tampon tax is a sex-based tax because it is a tax on a product
solely used by biological women. A sex-based tax is discriminatory even if
members of the other sex occasionally are the purchasers of the product. 229
Biological men may still pay the tax occasionally because they may
purchase feminine hygiene products for a partner, child, friend, or family
member, but that does not change the fact that the government is using sex
to push a product out of a tax-exemption zone into an area of taxation.
There is no comparable tax on any sex-based medical product
overwhelmingly used by men, for example. What distinguishes tampons
from common tax-exempt medical products like cotton balls and BandAids is that they are not gender neutral. The delineation in most state tax
regulations between exempted medical or health products and feminine
hygiene products is nonsensical. 230 Just as the Court in Reed v. Reed held
that sex should not be a preferential factor for choosing between two
comparable candidates for estate administrator,231 sex should not be a
preferable factor for choosing between which comparable medical products
and necessary goods to tax. It is difficult to think of a legitimate reason
why, for example, cotton balls would be defined as medical products while
tampons and sanitary pads are not classified as such, even though they are
similarly absorbent and just as, if not more, medically necessary.
Second, the law certainly has an inequitable economic effect on
biological women. The majority of purchasers of feminine hygiene
products are biological women, and the only people who use feminine
hygiene products are biological women. In Kahn, the Court upheld the tax
exemption for widowers as a move toward balancing out general economic
inequalities between men and women. 232 In the case of the tampon tax,
women are hurt economically by this tax, keeping them in their historical
subclass. The average American woman is estimated to use more than
16,000 tampons in her lifetime, 233 which one study estimated would cost
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230
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around $1,773. 234 The cost of feminine hygiene products on poor women is
especially burdensome, and the extra payment imposed by the tampon tax
can be very significant. Food pantries, for example, are often “desperate”
for feminine hygiene products because food stamps do not cover them. 235
Third, the tampon tax is based on stereotyping and misunderstandings
about women’s biology. Gender-based stereotyping underlies various state
tax regulations, especially in states and cities where tampons and sanitary
pads are categorized as “cosmetic and hygiene products.” 236 Considering
that women are vastly underrepresented in state legislatures, 237 and that
legal issues that mostly affect women often go unacknowledged by state
legislatures, 238 it is unsurprising but disappointing to find that maledominated legislatures would list neutral products and majority-male
products under the umbrella of tax exclusion while continuing to tax a
common medical product that is solely used by women. Because the Court
has tended dismiss justifications for discriminatory laws under the Equal
Protection Clause when they are based upon stereotypes, 239 the tampon tax
too should be found unconstitutional. For example, in Frontiero, the Court
deemed that administrative ease was not a sufficient reason for a state to
234

Jessica Kane, Here’s How Much a Woman’s Period Will Cost Her Over a Lifetime,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 22, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/18/period-costlifetime_n_7258780.html [https://perma.cc/D5GR-LD8Z]. This figure is based upon a woman changing
her tampon every six hours for a five-day duration per period cycle, thus using 20 tampons per cycle.
Id. The average woman has 456 periods during her lifetime, so multiplied by 20 tampons per cycle,
according to this method she will use approximately 9,120 tampons during her life. Id. For a $7 box of
36 tampons, this leads to an estimation of a total cost of $1,773.33 on tampons throughout a woman’s
lifetime. Id.
235
Tampon Tax: Does Being Female in the U.S. Carry Unfair Costs?, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2016,
2:39
PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-tampon-tax-20160309-story.html
[https://perma.cc/BF52-XNLN].
236
See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text (noting that Illinois, for example, places tampons
into the category of “grooming and hygiene products” and quoting a California lawmaker as stating that
there are no other taxes that are as gender biased).
237
See, e.g., Danielle Kurtzleben, Almost 1 in 5 Congress Members are Women. Here’s How Other
Jobs Compare, NPR (June 11, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/06/11/481424890/even-witha-female-presumptive-nominee-women-are-underrepresented-in-politics
[https://perma.cc/24CTZPGQ].
238
See, e.g., Till Death Do Us Part: Part 1, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.) (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://postandcourier.com/app/till-death/partone.html [https://perma.cc/GC4N-HWGB] (describing the
history of legislative inaction in South Carolina in dealing with high rates of domestic violence against
women and noting that “[t]hough state officials have long lamented the high death toll for women,
lawmakers have put little money into prevention programs and have resisted efforts to toughen penalties
for abusers” and that “[in 2014] alone, a dozen measures to combat domestic violence died in the
Legislature”); Till Death Do Us Part: Part Four, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.) (Aug. 22, 2014)
http://www.postandcourier.com/app/till-death/partfour.html [http://perma.cc/7GWS-3KRQ] (noting and
quoting state lawmakers who ignore the problem by blaming the female victims for the crimes).
239
See Cunningham-Parmeter supra note 187, at 26–27 and accompanying text.
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justify a law that conclusively presumed that women were the dependent
partner and men the breadwinners. 240 The administrative ease of taxing a
medically necessary product for biological women to maintain constant tax
revenue should likewise be insufficient for upholding the tampon tax in
jurisdictions where other medical items are tax-exempt.
Moreover, the very existence of the tampon tax underscores how the
government continues to neglect women’s needs. The federal government
has a long history of neglecting women’s concerns about the safety of
tampons. 241 For instance, the FDA delayed enacting a rule for standardized
absorbency descriptions on tampon packaging until the Public Citizen
lawsuit forced its hand years later. Even today, decades after women’s
health activists began pressing the FDA to regulate tampon manufacturing
and to provide consumers with ingredient information, the exact
components of each box of tampons are undisclosed. Moreover, the
traditional societal expectation of silence around menstruation and tampon
usage provides governments with more freedom to sideline menstruationrelated issues.242 Now, the feminist activism around the tampon tax has
brought to the surface the legislatures’ failures to consider women’s
menstruation a basic health issue and women’s feminine hygiene products
a basic health necessity. 243
It is not a stretch to find that tampons are excluded from tax
exemption due to the perceived inferiority of women and a general lack of
concern about and understanding of women’s biology. Crawford and
Spivack have described how, in the Western literary imagination, men are
perceived to bleed out of choiceusually due to a noble act in war or in
another controlled way, such as a voluntary medical remedybut women
bleed without choice or control, “thus making their effluvia not only
involuntary but also punitive and indicative of weakness.” 244 The subtle
societal characterization of menstruation as a sign of weakness and
something for girls and women to be ashamed of has created a culture of
silence about the importance of feminine hygiene products to women’s
health. Perceptions remain that tampons are an extraneous luxury and
misnomers persist regarding tampon usage. For instance, the French
240

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688–91 (1973).
See supra Section I.A.
242
See Gass-Poore’, supra note 18 (summarizing a state legislator as stating that “the reluctance to
talk about [menstruation] has prevented the issue from gaining more momentum in state legislatures”).
243
See, e.g., Jones, supra note 1.
244
Crawford & Spivack, supra note 31, at 510–11 (citing Gail Kern Paster, “In the Spirit of Men
There is No Blood”: Blood as Trope of Gender in Julius Caesar, 40 SHAKESPEARE Q. 284, 286–87
(1989)). The authors add that “[t]he tax treatment reinforces the notion that these products are optional
indulgences for a body whose boundaries should be subject to control.” Id. at 511.
241
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Minister of State for the Budget compared tampons’ necessity to that of
men’s shaving cream as a way to dismiss protesters calling for an
elimination of the tampon tax in France.245 It is bizarre to think of tampons
along the lines of shaving cream, and it is dismaying that outdated notions
about menstruation continue to thrive.
B. Government Justifications for the Tampon Tax: The Ends Don’t Justify
the Means
Moreover, states that tax tampons fail to meet the sufficiently related
justification prong of the intermediate scrutiny analysis for sex-based equal
protection claims. There are two main justifications in the case of the
tampon tax. The first potential justification a state could give is that
tampons do not fit into existing exemption categories because they are not
necessary products or medical products. The second likely explanation for
the tax is that the state wants a dependable revenue stream. Ultimately,
neither justification is persuasive.
Regarding the first potential government justification of the tax, that
female hygiene products are neither medical products nor necessities,
abundant research demonstrates the important medical role that tampons
and other feminine hygiene products play in women’s health. First, the
absorption function of tampons can prevent encrustation and the
transmission of blood and bodily fluids to others. 246 Additionally, tampon
use has been associated with decreased risk of endometriosis,247 a chronic
and painful disease that has been reported to have a similar impact on
women’s physical health-related quality of life as cancer.248 Furthermore,
proper use of sanitary products like tampons, pads, and menstrual cups
reduce the risk of reproductive tract infections, which are correlated with
poor menstrual hygiene practices, such as the use of old cloths.249
Accordingly, the American Medical Association supports efforts to
245

France Rejects “Tampon Tax” Change, supra note 123.
See Erika L. Meaddough et al., Sexual Activity, Orgasm and Tampon Use Are Associated with a
Decreased Risk for Endometriosis, 53 GYNECOLOGIC & OBSTETRIC INVESTIGATION 163, 163, 168
(2002) (explaining that the researchers found that women with endrometriosis tended to use tampons
less frequently than women without endrometriosis and thus researchers theorized that tampons may be
“more efficient at the removal of menstrual fluid compared to the use of pads”).
247
Id.
248
Kelechi E. Nnoaham et. al, Impact of Endometriosis on Quality of Life and Work Productivity:
A Multicenter Study Across Ten Countries, 96 FERTILITY & STERILITY 366, 370 (2011) (finding that
women with endometriosis who self-report the effect of the disease on their physical quality of life have
similar scores on that questionnaire as women with cancer).
249
A. Dasgupta & M. Sarkar, Menstrual Hygiene: How Hygienic Is the Adolescent Girl?, 2 INDIAN
J. COMMUNITY MED. 77, 80 (2008) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2784630/
[https://perma.cc/93UC-GEVE].
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eliminate the tax on tampons, calling them a “regressive penalty.” 250 The
Food and Drug Administration also classifies tampons and feminine
hygiene products as “medical appliances.” 251 Based upon the medical
benefits tampon use imparts on women and the federal classification of
tampons as medical appliances, state tax regulations should thus categorize
tampons as medical products in tax codes that have exemptions for medical
products and necessities.
Second, a government defending its tax on tampons will also contend
that it has a legitimate interest in enacting a strong tax revenue stream. To
succeed on an equal protection claim, the government must demonstrate
that the purpose of garnering tax revenue (the ends) sufficiently justifies the
creation of a sex-based tax for doing so (the means). The Supreme Court
has generally given states a lot of leeway to create and implement their tax
schemes as desired, 252 but eliminating the tampon tax does not undermine a
state’s authority to create its own tax scheme. The argument is not that
feminine hygiene products should inherently be tax-exempt. Rather, the
argument is that it is discriminatory to tax a sex-based medical necessity
within a tax scheme that has exemptions for medical and other necessary
products. The fact that the tax revenue from feminine hygiene products is
substantial and constant underscores their fundamental value to biological
girls and women of menstruation age.253
So, neither of the justifications for the tampon tax suffices to pass the
test. Instead, it seems to be an irrational, discriminatory double standard to
tax tampons but not to tax medical products and necessities that are gender
neutral or that are mostly used by men. Justice Scalia famously once wrote
that “[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.” 254 Likewise, a tax on
tampons is a tax on biological women. It is not a mere mistake or error—
the various departments of taxation of most U.S. states decided to levy a
tax on a product used solely by women. This tax should be found
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.

250
AMA Adopts New Policies on Final Day of Annual Meeting, supra note 159. In particular, the
AMA president-elect, David O. Barbe, M.D., said, “Feminine hygiene products are essential for
women’s health, and taxes on them are a regressive penalty . . . . We applaud the states that have
already eliminated sales taxes on these products, and we urge every state to follow suit.” Id.
251
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF, supra note 22.
252
See supra Section III.C.
253
See Fetters, supra note 20 (tracing the rise in tampon use by U.S. women).
254
Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993); see also id. (“Some
activities may be such an irrational object of disfavor that, if they are targeted, and if they also happen
to be engaged in exclusively or predominantly by a particular class of people, an intent to disfavor that
class can readily be presumed.”).
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CONCLUSION
Now is a unique time when activists have pushed into the spotlight a
form of economic gender-based discrimination that has existed in most
states for decades. The momentum of individuals and groups across the
country, who are gathering together and advocating for the elimination of
the tax on feminine hygiene products, is promising for reducing sex-based
inequalities in the United States and abroad. Taxes on tampons at the city
and state level in various U.S. states may be overturned by legislative
action, especially if public pressure and consciousness-raising regarding
menstruation and tampons continue. Class action lawsuits based on the
claim that the tampon tax violates the Equal Protection Clause should also
be successful, as the tax fails to meet the applicable standard. The tax on
tampons is not sufficiently tied to any state objective that warrants such
gender-based classification. Additionally, the economic and health
consequences of the tampon tax on menstruating biological women are
significant, especially for lower-income women. The decision for future
courts and legislators is simple: eliminate the tampon tax.
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